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Abstract 16 
One Health surveillance describes the systematic collection, validation, analysis, interpretation of data 17 
and dissemination of information collected on humans, animals and the environment to inform 18 
decisions for more effective, evidence- and system-based health interventions. During the second 19 
International Conference on Animal Health Surveillance (ICAHS) in Havana, Cuba, a panel discussion 20 
was organised to discuss the relevance of One Health in the context of surveillance. A number of 21 
success stories were presented which generally focused on the obvious interfaces between human 22 
and veterinary medicine such as zoonoses and food safety. Activities aimed at strengthening inter-23 
sectoral networking through technical collaboration, conferences, workshops and consultations have 24 
resulted in recommendations to advance the One Health concept. There are also several One Health 25 
educational programmes offered as Masters programmes. Continuing challenges to One Health 26 
surveillance were identified at both technical as well as organisational level. It was acknowledged that 27 
the public health sector and the environmental sector could be engaged more in One Health activities. 28 
Legal issues, hurdles to data sharing, unclear responsibilities and structural barriers between 29 
ministries prevent integrated action. Policy makers in the health sector often perceive One Health as 30 
a veterinary-driven initiative that is not particularly relevant to their priority problems. Whilst some 31 
funding schemes allow for the employment of scientists and technicians for research projects, the 32 
development of a sustainable One Health workforce has yet to be broadly demonstrated. Funding 33 
opportunities do not explicitly promote the development of One Health surveillance systems. In 34 
addition, organisational, legal and administrative barriers may prevent operational implementation. 35 
Strategies and communication across sectors need to be aligned. Whilst at the technical or local level 36 
the formal separation can be bridged, separate funding sources and budgets can jeopardise the overall 37 
strategy, especially if funding cuts are later required. To overcome such challenges, a strong business 38 
case for One Health surveillance is needed. This should include the costs and benefits of One Health 39 
activities or projects including consequences of different strategies as well as risks. Integrated training 40 
should also be further promoted. Future ICAHS conferences should continue to provide a platform for 41 
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discussing surveillance in the One Health context and to provide a forum for surveillance professionals 42 
from all relevant sectors to interact.  43 
1. Introduction 44 
“One Health” is a term that is used increasingly in a range of different contexts. There are several 45 
conferences held at regular intervals with a One Health focus (e.g. One Health Summit; International 46 
One Health Congress; International One Health Conference; International Conference on One 47 
Medicine One Science). A panel discussion was held during the second International Conference on 48 
Animal Health Surveillance (ICAHS) in Havana, Cuba to discuss the relevance of One Health in the 49 
context of surveillance. Here we aim to summarise that discussion. The authors were all members or 50 
facilitators of the panel. 51 
Whilst we acknowledge the usefulness of an accepted definition of One Health surveillance, the time 52 
available at ICAHS did not allow for the in-depth discussion such a topic requires and therefore this 53 
was deliberately excluded by the panel. Building on general definition of surveillance, we propose to 54 
use the term as follows: 55 
One Health surveillance describes the systematic collection, validation, analysis, interpretation 56 
of data and dissemination of information collected on humans, animals and the environment 57 
to inform decisions for more effective, evidence- and system-based health interventions. 58 
The panel discussion was recorded and notes were also taken. The following summary is not only 59 
based on notes but also includes additional examples, references and points contributed by the 60 
authors after the conference. This discussion can be structured around the different activities relevant 61 
to surveillance (Fig. 1). These include the operational aspects such as field implementation, sampling 62 
and laboratory activities. We also consider the management component which is relevant at different 63 
levels (local, regional, national), including strategic, legal and communication aspects. Finally, there is 64 
an important interface with interventions because surveillance rarely achieves a benefit on its own 65 
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but should be considered jointly with interventions (Häsler et al., 2011; Howe et al., 2013). This latter 66 
point was also highlighted in the panel discussion. Innovation in technological and scientific 67 
approaches is relevant in relation to any of the fields shaping future surveillance. 68 
 69 
Fig. 1. Aspects considered in the discussion of the current status and challenges for One Health surveillance. 70 
Surveillance is understood to inform interventions; the latter are therefore also included. 71 
2. One Health surveillance: where are we? 72 
During the ICAHS panel discussion, a number of examples of collaborative surveillance activities were 73 
mentioned that are conducted under the One Health umbrella (Goutard et al., 2015; Ward and 74 
Hernandez-Jover, 2015). The current success stories generally focus on the obvious interfaces 75 
between human and veterinary medicine such as zoonoses and food safety. One specific published 76 
example is the joint implementation of surveillance for brucellosis in Mongolia in which sero-77 
surveillance in people and monitoring of achieved vaccination coverage in livestock is conducted 78 
jointly with technical staff of both sectors, and in Kyrgyzstan joint brucellosis surveillance in people 79 
and livestock provided the basis for the development of an inter-sectoral cost-effective control 80 
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strategy (Zinsstag et al., 2009). Thus there is an opportunity for surveillance systems for brucellosis in 81 
cattle only – such as one presented by Bronner et al. (2015) at ICAHS – to be linked to human health 82 
surveillance to increase benefit. 83 
Successful One Health collaboration in surveillance was also reported in conjunction with infectious 84 
disease outbreaks. During one of the largest multi-country, food-borne outbreaks in Europe, many 85 
aspects of collaborative surveillance were discussed and recommendations made for improvements 86 
(Beutin and Martin, 2012). Also, examples of successful surveillance collaboration were reported 87 
during ICAHS for influenza (Bruhn et al., 2014) and for rabies (Mtema et al., 2014; Ward and 88 
Hernandez-Jover, 2015; Townsend et al., 2014). Such collaboration is, however, not necessarily 89 
common in animal influenza surveillance. A recent survey on national and regional animal influenza 90 
surveillance systems implemented worldwide revealed that, in the instance of influenza-positive 91 
poultry or pigs being identified, the public health sector would be alerted only in some occasions (Von 92 
Dobschuetz et al., 2014). Opportunities for closer collaboration in influenza surveillance were 93 
confirmed at ICAHS (Durr et al., 2015; Paul et al., 2015). 94 
Triggered by incidents such as the threat of a global influenza pandemic, a number of high-level, multi-95 
lateral activities were initiated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Health 96 
Organisation (WHO) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). These activities aimed to 97 
strengthen inter-sectoral networking through technical activities, conferences, workshops and 98 
consultations and have resulted in recommendations to advance the One Health concept.1,2,3,4,5 A 99 
further specific example of the international collaboration supported by OIE and FAO in practice and 100 
policy making of One Health, is the OIE and FAO network of expertise on animal influenza (OFFLU). 101 
This global network covers the exchange of scientific data and biological materials, provides technical 102 
advice and veterinary expertise, discusses research needs, and assures collaboration. OFFLU formally 103 
contributes to the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines. Furthermore 104 
OFFLU established an expert group for swine influenza which has membership from both the 105 
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veterinary and the public health sectors. The major task of this group is to compile SIV surveillance 106 
and virus data worldwide and monitor SIV evolution. 107 
Collaborative action is often easier to achieve at the local level. Nevertheless, often medical and 108 
veterinary data recording remain largely separate and therefore a lot of potentially useful information 109 
and knowledge sources are left untapped. An important step towards integrated surveillance has been 110 
achieved by aggregating databases at the human-animal interface; for example the GLEWS database6 111 
includes animal or zoonotic disease events for which information has been jointly gathered by FAO, 112 
OIE and WHO and confirmed by the national authorities. OFFLU is connected with national monitoring 113 
networks, in particular with the Influenza Virus Monitoring Network (IVM) recently established in 114 
Indonesia7 (Wibawa et al., 2014), composed of more than 10 laboratory members, which collectively 115 
monitor the emergence of possible variant influenza viruses in poultry. Such country networks can be 116 
instrumental in ensuring continuous influenza vaccine efficacy in poultry and arguably a model for 117 
other countries. The public health sector benefits from the outcomes of such monitoring networks. 118 
Another example of collaborative action at the local level is the establishment of the “4-way linking” 119 
platforms8 in three countries (Egypt, Vietnam and Indonesia) for joint public health-animal health risk 120 
assessment based on data from epidemiology units as well as laboratories. At ICAHS, Ward and 121 
Hernandez-Jover (2015) present a generic risk assessment tool for rabies which relies of inputs from 122 
both animal and human health; its use requires a collaborative approach. 123 
In Canada, information on risk factors and prevalence and resistance data for pathogens causing 124 
enteric diseases are collected along the food chain including animal and human sampling. The utility 125 
of the integration of information can be demonstrated, particularly in terms of early detection of 126 
emerging threats (Deckert et al., 2010; Parmley et al., 2014). Similarly, in Europe the agency 127 
responsible for animal health and food safety (EFSA) and the agency responsible for public health 128 
(ECDC) are jointly producing the annual zoonoses report.9 These agencies also increasingly collaborate 129 
around outbreaks, for example the emergence of Schmallenberg virus.10 Vectorborne disease 130 
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surveillance is an area in which a One Health approach is often possible. At ICAHS, Ezanno et al. (2015) 131 
described a generic weather-driven model to predict the risk of mosquito-borne disease transmission. 132 
To operationalise such a tool, input is required from both animal and human health sectors, with 133 
environmental factors being obvious drivers of the system ultimately developed. 134 
In terms of education and training, there have been a number of One Health courses and University 135 
programmes launched. Examples include the Masters in One Health programme delivered jointly by 136 
the Royal Veterinary College and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,11 the Master of 137 
Science One Health programme offered by the University of Edinburgh,12 the University of Florida's 138 
Masters in Health Sciences with One Health concentration and PhD in Public Health with One Health 139 
concentration13 and the new University of California Global Health Institute (UCGHI) Masters in Global 140 
Health degree programme with a One Health track, to commence in 2016.14 Under the Regional Field 141 
Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinary (FETPV) adapted and supported by FAO and partners in 142 
the Asia region, ‘One Health’ training courses have been organised. In China, the Chinese Field 143 
Epidemiology Training Program (CFETP) and the FETPV have held joint training sessions and in Thailand 144 
key linkages have been established between the Thai FETPV and the FETP. Going one step further, the 145 
Mongolian FETP programme since 2014 includes participants from the medical and veterinary sectors 146 
in a fully joint training course. 147 
These programmes do not specifically focus on surveillance, but do count on the links with surveillance 148 
units. All such programmes appear to have been developed only recently, mostly within the past 5 149 
years. The employment opportunities of graduates, as promoted by the programmes, tend to be 150 
either in operational aspects such as outbreak investigations (“graduates will have the knowledge and 151 
skills to be able to respond rapidly and effectively to outbreaks of disease as well as controlling 152 
endemic disease at the interface between humans, animals and the environment11”) or in the area of 153 
public policy (“the programme will enable students to … bring much-needed attention to the policy 154 
and operational issues that ultimately will be key determinants for success12”). 155 
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In addition to technical training, there are also programmes focusing on general leadership and 156 
networking. For example, the University of Minnesota runs a programme on engaging with 157 
international organisations and academic institutions from across the globe with a specific focus on 158 
One Health.15 In the Caribbean, the European Union funded project “One Health, One Caribbean, One 159 
Love” will include a 2-year One Health Leadership Series for young to mid-career professionals from 160 
the agriculture, health and environment sectors. Organised by PAHO/WHO and the University of the 161 
West Indies, the programme will include technical and leadership training, mentoring and One Health 162 
project formulation and management. Examples of regional networks include the South East Asia One 163 
Health University Network (SEAOHUN) and One Health Central and Eastern Africa (OHCEA) Network. 164 
These networks are funded through the USAID emerging pandemic threats programme (EPT) and 165 
focus on general capacity building, including surveillance. The scope, however, is specifically on 166 
infectious zoonotic diseases; in addition, these networks are limited to academic institutions and do 167 
not involve regulatory institutions that are under the authority of veterinary services or under the 168 
ministry of health. 169 
The Global Health Security agenda16 has recently been launched by the USA and has already been 170 
endorsed by over 40 countries. It acknowledges the need to integrate human and animal health 171 
interventions to better prevent, detect and control human diseases. This programme aims at 172 
strengthening country compliance with the International Health Regulations17 and can potentially 173 
generate collaborations, surveillance, interventions, research, and improved policies through a One 174 
Health approach (Jones et al., 2008). 175 
3. What are the main gaps and challenges 176 
Many continuing challenges were discussed at the ICAHS conference. These included both technical 177 
as well as organisational issues. It was acknowledged that the public health sector could be engaged 178 
more in One Health activities. Legal issues, hurdles to data sharing, unclear responsibilities, structural 179 
barriers between Ministries of Health, Agriculture and the Environment/Natural Resources and a lack 180 
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of communication were all raised as obstacles to progress. In terms of data sharing, FAO, OIE and WHO 181 
have been working collaboratively in effectively implementing a framework to promote cooperation 182 
between human and animal surveillance systems for analysing available evidence and evaluating 183 
responses and the timely sharing of comparable epidemiological and pathogen data across the 184 
relevant sectors.18 185 
When planning to engage the public sector, one of the most important issues to consider is the legal 186 
basis. Over several years, the OIE developed an approach aimed at strengthening Veterinary Services 187 
(VS) in all its components for improving animal and public health, through its PVS Pathway.19 An 188 
important conclusion of these evaluations has been the great need for appropriate legal basis of VS 189 
worldwide. When operating surveillance systems within the One Health perspective, all countries 190 
need to acknowledge and implement mechanisms to assure a legal basis for these joint surveillance 191 
activities. In countries where the “4-way linking” assessment missions have been operational, real-192 
time sharing of information at the field level was often functionally possible and accepted, if not 193 
desired, between human and animal health local officers; however the barrier to sharing was at the 194 
policy level where the necessary support was not in place to allow full sharing of all information. At 195 
ICAHS, an encouraging example was also presented on cross-sectorial collaboration in Mongolia 196 
(Wieland et al., 2015). 197 
In the Caribbean, PAHO/WHO and FAO developed a One Health policy for the region.20 Whilst it was 198 
relatively easy to obtain support in the agricultural livestock sector, this was more challenging in the 199 
health sector, where the priorities are quite different (focus on non-communicable diseases, 200 
childhood obesity and mental health). The policy makers in the health sector often perceive One 201 
Health as a veterinary-driven initiative that is not particularly relevant to their priority problems. In 202 
addition, we have yet to fully capture the ecosystem health sector in the One Health approach. 203 
However, the significant effect of climate change on public health, animal and ecosystem health in the 204 
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Caribbean constitutes a powerful argument for One Health surveillance with information sharing 205 
across the three sectors. 206 
Some notable funding programmes have been initiated which either directly address research on One 207 
Health surveillance, or which incorporate One Health principles into surveillance programmes. Some 208 
recent examples include the call for research on Zoonoses and Emerging Livestock Systems (UK), the 209 
Canadian call on Ecosystem approaches to the better management of zoonotic emerging infectious 210 
diseases in the Southeast Asia region and the Gates Foundation's Grand Challenge in One Health. 211 
These funding opportunities have been targeted at research in developing countries and often focused 212 
on specific zoonotic diseases, such as brucellosis, trypanosomiasis and tuberculosis. Whilst funding 213 
may be used to employ researchers and technicians, the development of a sustainable One Health 214 
workforce has yet to be broadly demonstrated. In general, current funding opportunities do not 215 
explicitly promote the development of One Health surveillance systems. One of the barriers to funding 216 
One Health surveillance – whether in developed or developing countries – is a widely held belief that 217 
such activities are in the national interest (protection and promotion of national trade in livestock and 218 
livestock products, and improvement of the health of the local human population) and therefore 219 
should be funded by national governments. There is a need to differ between research funding and 220 
funding to develop the necessary societal infrastructure which is lacking in the developed world 221 
perhaps even more than in the developing world. Although One Health surveillance systems are 222 
promoted by international organisations, funding mechanisms are largely absent and surveillance 223 
remains insufficient in many fields and in many regions. Regional approaches to disease surveillance 224 
exist – for example in the case of foot-and-mouth disease in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia or 225 
classical swine fever in Latin America and the Caribbean – but similar examples of regional One Health 226 
surveillance systems are rare. As described by Goutard et al. (2015) at ICAHS, a combination of 227 
participatory methods and modern technologies could help to overcome the constraints inherent to 228 
the low-income countries. 229 
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In addition to funding, organisational and structural barriers may prevent the operational 230 
implementation of One Health surveillance. The importance of different priorities between Ministries 231 
of Health and Agriculture becomes apparent when it comes to joint control strategies. For example, 232 
legal and administrative hurdles hinder approval of a joint brucellosis control strategy in Mongolia. In 233 
such situations it is therefore critical that the separate strategies are aligned and that communication 234 
across sectors ensures consistency from implementation to monitoring of the strategy. Whilst at the 235 
technical level and even at the local level, this formal separation can be overcome through 236 
strengthened collaboration of technical personal, separate funding lines can jeopardise the overall 237 
strategy, especially if budget cuts are required. 238 
 239 
In the Caribbean, when trying to promote joint planning and budgeting between Ministries of Health 240 
and Agriculture for inter-sectoral activities at the interface, some professionals have replied that this 241 
is impossible. However, in Trinidad and Tobago, this problem was circumvented by forming a cabinet-242 
appointed multi-sectoral task force on zoonotic diseases, in which joint planning and budgeting are 243 
done. Another example of organisational integration is in Switzerland where the newly formed Federal 244 
Food Safety and Veterinary Office facilitates formal collaboration between the sectors. Although 245 
budgetary separation from the Federal Office of Public Health remains, the two agencies at least 246 
report to the same minister. 247 
 248 
Partnership between the public and private sector is a key element for disease prevention, detection 249 
and control. The animal industry may conduct their own surveillance for diseases that may be zoonotic 250 
and have their own vaccination programmes against specific diseases. The barriers of information 251 
sharing between the private and the public sectors is quite specific to the animal sector, due to 252 
commerce of animals and their products; however these barriers may have negative health 253 
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consequences as public health interventions may be delayed. It is well documented with H5N1 HPAI 254 
and H7N9 LPAI influenza viruses that human activities and behaviours (i.e., trading and marketing) are 255 
significant factors in disease spread and persistence in domestic poultry. The animal health sector and 256 
the public health sector therefore ought to take into account human behaviours and actions in their 257 
risk-based surveillance and risk assessment activities. Both sectors can take the opportunity to learn 258 
from each other and plan joint activities. For example, the USDA as part of their influenza 259 
surveillance21,22 has developed mechanisms for anonymous sharing of SIV isolates by the US swine 260 
industry with public veterinary laboratories; this mechanism ensures sharing of useful information for 261 
both the animal and public health sector whilst protecting swine trade interests. A study presented at 262 
ICAHS (Paul et al., 2015) suggests how social anthropology methods can be used to better understand 263 
reasons for suboptimal avian influenza surveillance. 264 
In some countries, substantial surveillance efforts are conducted by the private sector. For example, 265 
in Switzerland, the poultry industry conducts surveillance for zoonotic hazards such as Campylobacter 266 
contamination. However, these data are not shared with other decision makers, notably the 267 
veterinary services. This is seen as a missed opportunity as already collected data would be of added 268 
value to official programmes. Some countries such as Sweden have overcome this barrier such that 269 
industry-driven surveillance is funded by government and therefore becomes a collaborative activity 270 
with data sharing. 271 
4. What is needed to progress One Health surveillance 272 
An important conclusion discussed by the panel was the “beer-and-pizza concept” (as mentioned by 273 
Professor Craig Stephen, Univ. of Calgary, during the ICAHS conference). This was described as using 274 
incentives for professionals from different backgrounds to meet in a relaxed and friendly environment. 275 
This should help build relationships in a neutral issue-free environment that may be essential in a 276 
future crisis situation. It was also indicated that the next generation of surveillance professionals may 277 
be more open to communicate informally and to trust their peers. There is also an important role for 278 
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conferences such as ICAHS to promote dialogue and opportunities for exchange. It was, however, also 279 
indicated that the variety of competing One Health conferences was unhelpful to shape and focus the 280 
One Health community. 281 
 282 
To put more convincing arguments in front of hesitant policy makers, investors, managers and 283 
colleagues, a strong business case for One Health surveillance was requested, a need that has been 284 
acknowledged for some time (Hueston et al., 2013; Grace, 2014). This should include the costs and 285 
benefits of One Health activities or projects including potential consequences of different strategies 286 
as well as risks (Anonymous, 2012). One Health surveillance should lead to faster disease detection, 287 
more efficient disease control and tangible financial savings when formally compared against 288 
separated surveillance streams. Specifically for surveillance, a project was presented at ICAHS which 289 
considers the economic aspects of cross-sectoral surveillance (Babo Martins et al., 2014). A recent 290 
review on One Health metrics also identified many examples that demonstrated the added value of 291 
One Health, but also confirmed the lack of systematic recording and metrics of benefits (Häsler et al., 292 
2014). To move towards development of useful metrics, small specific projects should be more 293 
successful in demonstrating tangible benefits than big vague concepts. It is expected that many more 294 
examples will be presented at the next ICAHS. Thus, we should be able to quantify if and when One 295 
Health surveillance can add value. 296 
ICAHS participants were in agreement that organisational solutions favouring One Health surveillance 297 
will take time, although some positive examples are already available. Typically, organisational 298 
structures will adapt more quickly after a crisis situation. For example, the struggle with bovine 299 
spongiform encephalopathy led to the creation of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Also 300 
several European countries consequentially re-organised their authorities related to food (e.g. Austria, 301 
Germany, Switzerland, UK), thus integrating veterinary and public health aspects in a stable-to-table 302 
approach. Joint budgets certainly enhance joined-up high-level decision making. However, the focus 303 
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on food alone is not enough. Wider collaboration is required across offices and ministries as well as at 304 
international level. The FAO, WHO and OIE have signed a tripartite agreement to cooperate on issues 305 
at the human animal interface.23 306 
The One Health approach and policy for surveillance has progressed in both the developing and the 307 
developed world. The developing world faces major increases of human and animal populations and 308 
densities with a trend for closer interactions between these human and animal populations, including 309 
wildlife. The developing world also faces severe gaps in surveillance in general, and in epidemiological 310 
knowledge and robust laboratory competency in particular. Although the developing world has 311 
progressed in One Health, One Health surveillance still needs to be translated at local and community 312 
level where policies are operationalised (Anonymous, 2013). 313 
Health training has suffered the effect of “silos” in the same way that efforts to address human health, 314 
animal health and environmental health have become artificially segregated within the government 315 
or academic sector. More than 100 years ago, medical training was broad; with the advent of 316 
specialisation in the latter part of the 20th Century, particularly the medical and veterinary sciences 317 
became separated. An ideal, albeit long-term, approach to promoting One Health is to train medical, 318 
veterinary and environmental scientists in partly overlapping curricula whilst recognising that each 319 
will pursue different career pathways. Although a handful of One Health-focused postgraduate 320 
programmes have been established, their sustainability and career chances for their graduates are yet 321 
to be demonstrated. Training at an undergraduate level, in which the inter-relatedness of medical, 322 
veterinary and environmental sciences is promoted, arguably would have a much larger and long-term 323 
impact and create the conditions in which One Health surveillance would become an obvious solution 324 
to addressing a wide range of problems we currently face. An ideal case study would be antimicrobial 325 
resistance surveillance, where part of the responsibility lies in the agricultural veterinary and medical 326 
realm, but also has environmental implications via waste management routes. 327 
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The view was expressed at ICAHS that it was important to acknowledge that not everybody had to 328 
work with all sectors in order to assure that the key objectives relevant to One Health were pursued. 329 
Such inter-sectoral collaboration is likely to be essential in some areas whilst it is irrelevant for others. 330 
The priority should be that the relevant work is done effectively and efficiently. 331 
Finally, it was suggested that future ICAHS conferences should continue to provide a platform for 332 
discussing surveillance in the One Health context. The invitation of keynote speakers with medical and 333 
environmental backgrounds should be assured for the continuing challenge of the mainly veterinary 334 
audience. Hopefully, discussions around terminology will also progress over the coming years in order 335 
to avoid the ongoing confusion and uncertainty on practical consequences of the One Health 336 
approach. 337 
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